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Abstract: Energy labelling and minimum efficiency performance standards have 
proved to be very effective in stimulating energy efficiency improvement in the 
domestic appliance sector. But standards suffer from long and often difficult 
implementation periods because of the resistance of the industrial sector. As a 
consequence, the question has been raised as to whether similar results could not be 
obtained more easily and at lower cost with voluntary agreements, which offer 
flexibility margins in the achievement of commitments. This paper analyses the 
specific advantages of voluntary agreements compared with efficiency standards in 
the domestic appliance sector. We conclude that voluntary agreements may be an 
effective instrument in this respect but in certain conditions. The alternative of 
regulatory measures must remain a credible, realistic threat if voluntary agreements 
are to have a really significant impact on performance improvement. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Because of the increase in the use of lighting and the rising ownership of household 
appliances and electronic equipment, domestic electricity consumption for specific 
uses (household electrical appliances and lighting) has increased dramatically over 
the last twenty years in industrialized countries. According to the International 
Energy Agency, household appliances are the second greatest source of electricity 
consumption in the OECD countries and the third source of greenhouse gas 
emissions (IEA, 2003). Consumption will probably continue to grow at a steady rate 
despite the expected saturation in ownership level of certain appliances. The IEA 
has projected that electricity consumption by domestic appliances will continue to 
increase by 25 % between 2000 and 2020 despite the energy management policies P. MENANTEAU  2
already introduced [the increase would have been 60 % without any kind of energy 
policies (Ibid.)].  
The possibility of controlling growth in electricity consumption, especially in the 
residential and tertiary sectors, is one of the conditions for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in virtually all the industrialised countries. The technological 
opportunities for improving the energy efficiency of electrical appliances are 
numerous (IPCC, 2001), but because of market risks these opportunities have not 
been sufficiently explored by manufacturers. Public policies introduced in this field 
are designed to accelerate the penetration of more energy efficient technologies and 
to inject more momentum into the process of technological change.  
  The strategy adopted by the European Union to accelerate the diffusion of 
energy efficient technologies has been to associate a consumer information device - 
a labelling programme - with a regulatory device in the form of minimum energy 
performance standards (MEPS). Energy labelling of domestic cold appliances thus 
became compulsory in all the European member States in 1995 and subsequently for 
other domestic appliances, in particular, washing machines, dishwashers, clothes 
dryers, and residential lighting equipment.. This was followed in 1999 by MEPS 
designed to eliminate the least efficient products from the market. 
This combined approach was effective in transforming the household appliance 
market, with labelling acting as an incentive to innovate and thereby complementing 
the regulatory approach which is generally not very effective in stimulating 
innovation. However, regulations raise a lot of opposition among manufacturers and 
consequently often require considerable time for implementation. The more flexible 
solution of voluntary agreements thus emerges as a possible alternative that is easier 
to implement while remaining just as effective.  
The aim of this paper is to examine whether negotiated agreements can be as 
effective in stimulating the diffusion of more energy-efficient technologies in the 
household appliance sector as the combined action of labelling and performance 
standards. First, we illustrate the effectiveness of this combination of information 
and regulatory measures by referring to the example of cold domestic appliances, 
and we show that the synergy of the two instruments makes it possible to go beyond 
the usual limits of the regulatory approach in stimulating technical progress. We 
then examine the advantages of negotiated agreements from the point of view of the 
manufacturers and the public authorities and the reasons why the European 
Commission is increasingly interested today in adopting this type of approach to 
improve energy efficiency in the household appliance sector. We provide details of 
the negotiated agreements on washing machines that became applicable at the same 
time as the regulations concerning cold appliance performance standards, thus 
making it possible to observe the similarities and differences between these two 
instruments. Our discussion concludes that negotiated agreements can be truly 
effective only if there is a constant, credible threat of regulations. 
2. THE SYNERGIC EFFECTS OF LABELLING AND EFFICIENCY 
STANDARDS  
The European policy concerning transformation of the domestic appliance market 
was implemented essentially through two complementary measures: labelling 
programs to improve consumer awareness and MEPS. This combination may seem STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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paradoxical in that performance standards are intended to set regulatory efficiency 
levels when the price signal is ineffective in promoting energy efficiency, whereas 
the primary purpose of labelling is in fact to provide a market signal to stimulate the 
purchase of efficient appliances by better informing consumers. Experience in the 
European Union over the last few years has proved, however, that these two 
instruments can co-exist very effectively and have very interesting characteristics 
where stimulating technological change is concerned.  
2.1 Impact of energy labelling on purchasing behaviour 
Lack of information for consumers is generally considered to be one of the main 
barriers to improving energy efficiency through the adoption of more energy 
efficient technologies. Comparison labels and endorsement labels are two ways of 
solving this problem by providing information on the energy efficiency of 
appliances, thereby encouraging consumers to compare products and choose the 
most efficient.  
Comparison labels enable consumers to compare the energy efficiency of all the 
products in a particular category (refrigerator/freezers, clothes dryers, washing 
machines, etc.). The European Label – EUR- or EnergyGuide – USA are examples 
of such labels. Endorsement labels simply identify appliances which are particularly 
energy efficient. An example is the Energy Star program in the USA. The first type 
generally applies to all the products on the market, whereas endorsement labelling is 
a voluntary scheme in which manufacturers may participate. 
Following the example of the USA and Canada, Europe introduced a framework 
for energy labelling in 1992 (comparison labels). The program became effective in 
1995 for domestic cold appliances and has gradually been extended to cover other 
household appliances. This measure has undoubtedly contributed to transforming the 
domestic appliance market even if its impact is difficult to distinguish from the 
general trend in improved energy efficiency resulting from improved knowledge (cf. 
supra). An analysis of sales from 1994 to 1999 shows a clear trend towards greater 
overall energy efficiency in the domestic cold appliance market in Europe, with a 
significant shift in sales towards more efficient appliances (classes A, B and C) at 
the expense of the less efficient classes (E, F and G) (Figure 1). By the end of the 
1990s, there was a 30% improvement in average energy efficiency compared with 
the beginning of the decade (CEC, 2000).  
Energy labelling thus led to a transformation of the cold appliance market which 
is the result of a change in consumer preferences and changes in the marketing 
strategies of manufacturers and retailers (ECU, 1998). The influence of labelling on 
the innovation strategies of manufacturers can be interpreted as follows: anticipating 
changes in consumer preferences or future regulations, manufacturers discontinued 
certain models that had become difficult to sell (expensive and not energy efficient), 
improved - sometimes marginally - the appliances destined to remain on the market 
and gradually introduced new more efficient products. In 1998 at the Confortec 
electrical appliance show, all the manufacturers had introduced new more efficient 
models into their product ranges, and some had focussed on energy efficiency by 
































Source: CEC, 2000 
Figure 1: Cold domestic appliance sales in Europe 
Labelling is thus a powerful instrument for differentiating products, and one 
which can promote innovation among manufacturers who wish to use this device to 
improve their competitive position or to gain an edge in new market niches. 
But labelling programs clearly have their limits. Their success depends to a great 
extent on the differences in efficiency between appliances and the related financial 
stakes for purchasers. Furthermore, labelling does not prevent the least efficient 
models from remaining on the market nor consumers from buying them. For this 
reason, programs imposing MEPS for household appliances generally accompany 
labelling programs. 
2.2 Labelling and efficiency standards: a necessary complementarity 
By definition, efficiency standards are based on a regulatory process which affects 
all the manufacturers in a particular country or economic region. The aim of such 
standards is to complement labelling schemes or to replace them in cases where the 
energy price signal is not strong enough to encourage consumers to purchase the 
more efficient appliances, which may happen even though comprehensive 
information is supplied. 
In Europe, domestic cold appliances were the first to be subjected to 
performance standards. According to the Directive 96/57/CE of the European 
Parliament:  
Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that refrigeration appliances 
covered by this Directive can be placed on the Community market only if the electricity 
consumption of the appliance in question is less than or equal to the maximum 
allowable electricity consumption value for its category as calculated according to the 
procedures defined in Annex I. STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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The standard was chosen so as to obtain an improvement of 15% in the average 
energy efficiency of new appliances. From September 1999, appliances not 
belonging to efficiency classes A, B or C could no longer be sold, which meant that 
40 % of the appliances on sale in 1996 had to be withdrawn from the market.  
The effectiveness of the regulations is evident from an examination of the new 
products introduced on the market:  
All D, E, F and G appliances have been removed from the market, with the exception of 
chest freezers, for which E-class appliances can still be sold (Appliance Efficiency, 
2000).  
Are we to understand that labelling has just been a preparatory step to the 
introduction of legislation on energy efficiency, the latter being ultimately the most 
effective instrument for transforming the market? Does labelling still have an impact 
or can such schemes be discontinued to leave efficiency standards to do the job 
alone? 
When efficiency standards are introduced, manufacturers are encouraged to 
improve their products so as to comply with legislation, but it does not necessarily 
encourage them to develop new highly efficient products if they are not required to 
do so by the consumers. To promote innovation, very stringent energy efficiency 
levels must be imposed, so that manufacturers will be compelled to innovate, or 
provision must be made for a gradual tightening up of regulations taking into 
account the improvements already made. But without additional incentives, the 
energy efficiency of appliances would remain overall much the same, since (most) 
manufacturers would simply ensure that their products were positioned just beyond 
the regulatory performance level. Manufacturers can in that case oppose the 
introduction of new more stringent standards by arguing that the new targets are not 
realistic from a technological or economic point of view.  
The advantage of labelling programs is not simply that they facilitate the 
introduction of standards by defining efficiency classes that can be used to 
determine the authorised efficiency levels. Labels also have a very important role in 
encouraging differentiation and are thus an incentive to technological progress. With 
labelling, manufacturers have the possibility of differentiating their appliances from 
standard products, something they can achieve through innovation. This will 
gradually have an impact on all the appliances on the market and ultimately lead to 
higher efficiency standards.  
By stimulating the arrival of new more efficient products on the market, labelling 
schemes thus condition the effectiveness of regulations. Such schemes must be 
constantly reviewed if they are to remain a way of differentiating between products. 
If efficiency classes are not redefined regularly, the combined result of labelling and 
standards will be that most appliances will be positioned in the highest efficiency 
classes and it will be impossible to identify new appliances that are even more 
energy efficient. A labelling scheme which can evolve and which operates in 
conjunction with MEPS that are periodically revised thus seems to be a particularly 
effective method and one that appears well suited to the transformation of the 
household appliance market. 
2.3. The limits of regulatory measures P. MENANTEAU  6
The regulatory approach nevertheless has certain limits. In particular, it is reputed to 
provide little incentive for technical change. Faced with the introduction of 
performance levels, manufacturers generally react by proposing products that meet 
the minimum requirements but they are not encouraged to go beyond these. 
Furthermore, the apparent simplicity of the regulatory approach should not hide the 
real difficulties involved in implementation. The great majority of manufacturers are 
opposed to the introduction of MEPS which they consider to be a limitation on their 
room to manoeuvre in terms of technological innovation. For them, such standards 
represent an additional constraint that results in higher production costs. Coupled 
with costs related to new environmental regulations (elimination of CFCs for 
refrigerators), this increase in production costs will be reflected in the selling price 
and could have a negative effect on the household appliance market. Finally, 
manufacturers are not a priori convinced that greater energy efficiency is necessarily 
desired by consumers, especially if it means sacrificing certain features to which 
they have become attached (for example, American style two-door refrigerators 
which consume considerably more electricity). 
Without the cooperation of manufacturers, defining MEPS generally becomes a 
long and complex process (cf. infra). Thus the initial proposal to introduce 
performance standards in Canada in 1984 met with strong opposition from Canadian 
household appliance manufacturers’ associations, which succeeded in blocking the 
initiative until 1988. Their position with respect to standards radically changed, 
however, following adoption of federal standards by the United States in 1987, a 
decision that engendered certain economic risks for Canadian industry (Varone, 
1998).  
On the other hand, the introduction of a single federal regulation in the United 
States was carried out relatively quickly because of manufacturers’ concerns about 
the increasing number of specific performance standards in different American 
states. The constraint of a federal standard was then considered to be preferable to 
the risk of development of a national market that was totally heterogeneous from the 
point of view of technical requirements. If it had not been for this very specific 
context, federal regulations on energy efficiency may not have seen the light of day, 
or at least not as rapidly. 
Similarly, the process leading to the adoption in Europe of a regulatory measure 
on the energy performances of domestic cold appliances was very long. According 
to European Community law, member States cannot introduce national legislation 
that might limit the free movement of goods and services within the European 
Union. The Commission thus quite logically opposed the decision of certain member 
States, at the beginning of 1990s, to introduce MEPS for household appliances, but 
agreed, on the other hand, to prepare common regulations for the Union within a 
relatively short time. The proposed directive was presented to Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers in December 1994, which was more than 2 years after The 
Netherlands had informed the Commission of their draft regulation on the energy 
efficiency of refrigerators
1. This considerable time lapse may be explained by the 
difficulty of negotiations with manufacturers who contested the principle of 
regulations but also with certain member States which considered that such 
regulations would have very different economic consequences from one country to 
the next  (Bertoldi, 1999). STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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While regulatory measures appear well suited to improving energy efficiency in 
the household appliance and office automation sectors, it cannot be denied that they 
present implementation problems on account of opposition from manufacturers. 
Adopting an approach of consultation and negotiation between public authorities 
and private actors with a view to defining objectives for energy efficiency 
improvement may, in these conditions, prove to be just as effective and even quicker 
to put into practice. 
3. VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATIONS? 
Since the early 1990s, voluntary agreements have been considered an instrument of 
environmental policy in their own right (S. Baecke and alii, 1999). They are no 
longer limited to certain sectors such as waste management, electricity generation, 
or the high energy-consuming industries but have been gradually extended to other 
sectors, including fairly recently to the home appliance market.  
Recently the European Commission negotiated agreements with manufacturers 
of televisions and video cassette recorders, as well as with washing machine 
manufacturers, with the aim of improving the energy efficiency of these appliances 
(CCE, 2000). Reflecting the position of certain member States and a large majority 
of manufacturers, the Commission is showing a growing interest in such negotiated 
agreements, which are increasingly seen as an alternative to what are felt to be 
overly restrictive regulations.  
3.1. More effective than regulations from a theoretical point of view 
In theory, voluntary commitments have a number of features which, in economic 
terms, make them more effective than regulatory measures. 
When it comes to defining efficient environmental objectives in economic terms, 
public authorities are penalised by their poor knowledge of existing technical 
options and the cost of implementing them. There is information asymmetry 
between manufacturers, who are very well informed about technologies and costs, 
and the regulating authority. The consequences have two aspects:  
-  it is in the interest of firms subjected to the regulations to overestimate pollution 
abatement costs to encourage the regulating authority to define less restrictive 
overall objectives. 
-  it is impossible to impose differentiated objectives to take into account the 
particular situation of each firm. This means that marginal pollution abatement 
costs differ for each firm, which for the economist characterises an inefficient 
solution. 
Voluntary agreements have a theoretical advantage in this respect in that 
distribution of the objectives among the different firms is left to the firms 
themselves. Pollution abatement objectives can thus be allocated among the firms 
according to their particular technical possibilities and implementation costs. Cost 
minimisation is reached if the allocation leads to the equalisation of private marginal 
abatement costs; the distribution of objectives is then optimal (Glachant, 1999). In 
reality, burden sharing is not necessarily optimal, but the principle of negotiating 
individual commitments introduces an element of flexibility not found in the 
regulatory approach. P. MENANTEAU  8
Furthermore, the inter-firm negotiations and cooperation that are necessitated by 
voluntary commitments in any given sector can contribute to a collective learning 
process that is beneficial to each individual firm:  
When using voluntary agreements, intense collective learning improves information of 
the firms and allows them to implement their private pollution abatement objectives at 
lower cost (M. Glachant, 1999).  
This works for a relatively homogeneous business sector and in a context of 
general uncertainty:  
All the firms are in the same situation of uncertainty concerning available techniques 
and related costs, and are more encouraged to co-operate with one another to make up 
for the lack of information (C. Defeuilley, 2000). 
Another advantage of voluntary agreements compared with regulations is that 
the negotiation framework gives firms the chance to participate directly in defining 
the objectives and the target dates for implementation. It is true that public 
authorities may also consult industry when drawing up regulations, but it is the 
regulator that has the final word. In the case of voluntary agreements, the objectives 
are defined jointly by manufacturers and the public authority.  
Voluntary agreements also have a number of advantages for public authorities:  
-  similar environmental objectives can be reached in a shorter time and at a lower 
cost than in the case of regulations because of the voluntary nature of 
manufacturers’ participation.  
-  where there is asymmetry of information (general case), negotiating with 
companies can provide the regulating body with the opportunity to obtain 
information about technologies and implementation costs.  
-  finally, since commitments are partly self-monitored by participating 
companies, public administration and monitoring costs are reduced. 
But voluntary agreements have different limits. When a few firms make a 
voluntary commitment, the others may feel that they do not have to make any 
significant effort to reduce pollution and the overall impact on pollution abatement 
may be limited. Voluntary agreements must therefore involve a large majority of 
manufacturers in the market or define an overall objective for energy efficiency 
improvement if there is to be any effective benefit to the environment. 
Moreover, the real environmental impact of a voluntary agreement cannot be 
measured simply in terms of achieving objectives. The objectives themselves must 
correspond to a real effort on the part of firms and not simply be part of a general 
trend in energy efficiency improvement. Since such agreements are by definition the 
fruit of negotiations where each party does not have the same information, the 
regulating authority does not know the real effort that will be required from the 
firms involved. The objective agreed upon may correspond to the general trend in 
energy efficiency improvement (business as usual scenario) and require no 
additional effort from the manufacturers. In this case the agreement would have no 
environmental impact in itself. 
Finally, voluntary agreements can be upsetting for individual markets. Where a 
limited number of companies are signatory, non-participating firms benefit from 
short-term advantages (continued use of high-pollution, low-cost technologies, 
limited R&D investments, etc.) compared with those who agree to contribute to a 
joint effort to respect pollution abatement commitments (free-riding behaviour). On STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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the other hand, an agreement limited to a few firms with a certain technological lead 
could give them a strong market position and end up creating unfair competition. 
Table 1: Effectiveness of regulations and voluntary agreements 




Participation of firms  -  +/-  ++ 
Implementation time  -  -  ++ 
Administrative costs  -  -  + 
Incentive to innovate  -  +  +/- 
Environmental impact  +  ++  +/- 
3.2. The example of negotiated agreements for washing machines 
In 1996, the European Committee of Manufacturers of Domestic Equipment 
(CECED) drew up a proposal for a voluntary agreement to improve the energy 
efficiency of washing machines sold in Europe. This proposal led to the first 
negotiated agreement with the European Commission on energy efficiency in the 
domestic appliance sector (CECED, 1997). It was followed by several other 
proposals concerning televisions and video cassette recorders, dishwashers, electric 
water heaters and refrigerators, while during the same period no new regulations 
governing MEPS were introduced. For the Commission, negotiated agreements 
modelled on the one described below are now a credible alternative to regulatory 
measures.  
3.2.1. Content of agreement 
The proposal was discussed in depth by manufacturers and the European 
Commission and an agreement was finally concluded in December 1998 whereby 
manufacturers agreed to: 
-  improve the energy efficiency of washing machines sold in the European 
Union: the objective was a 20% improvement over the period 1994-2000, 
corresponding to a reduction in the energy consumption of a standard wash 
cycle from 0.30 kWh/kg in 1994 to 0.24 kWh/kg in 2000. 
-  gradually phase out production and importation of the least efficient models in 
two successive stages: in the case of standard washing machines
2 elimination of 
models in energy label classes E, F and G from 31 December 1997, followed by 
those in class D from 31 December 1999, 
-  inform consumers about the conditions of use of washing machines and their 
impact on energy consumption (choice of programmes), conduct research 
programmes on low-temperature washing techniques, and increase cooperation 
with detergent manufacturers. 
Furthermore, the CECED agreed to monitor improvements in the energy 
efficiency of washing machines and report regularly to the European Commission. P. MENANTEAU  10
This provided a way of checking that manufacturers’ commitments were genuine 
and that the objectives were reached. 
The Commission’s approval confirmed the acceptance of the proposal by the 
public authorities and the implicit agreement not to introduce regulations imposing 
MEPS for this type of equipment for the duration of the agreement (Bertoldi and 
Bowie, 1997).  
3.2.2. A transparent procedure for defining objectives 
The procedure for defining the objectives adopted in the context of these agreements 
is particularly interesting. Indeed, it might be quite legitimate to question the reality 
of the additional efforts made by manufacturers in the framework of certain 
agreements, especially when the objectives negotiated correspond to spontaneous 
technological progress. In the present case, the objectives accepted by manufacturers 
were defined on the basis of a preliminary analysis conducted by the public 
authorities for the purpose of drawing up regulations (GEA, 1995). This technical-
economic analysis was used to estimate an “optimum” energy efficiency level 
among the different technological options available (least life cycle cost analysis), 
taking into account overall cost and return on investment of each option in relation 
to a reference situation. The energy efficiency improvement recommended on the 
basis of this study, considered to be technically possible and economically viable, 
was 25% compared with 1994. The proposal from manufacturers made explicit 
reference to this study, suggesting a target of a 20% improvement over a 5-year 
period (1994 –1999). 
3 
Unlike certain voluntary agreements where the objectives are defined more or 
less unilaterally by industry and where improvements are hard to distinguish from 
the general trends in technological progress and/or spontaneous development of the 
markets, the energy efficiency improvement targets here were based on an 
independent analysis. They took into account the state of technology and prospects 
for improvement, as well as the economic consequences for consumers. As F. 
Moretti, Chairman of the CECED working group on energy efficiency, points out:  
As it is based on the conclusion of a SAVE Study, it is guaranteed that the total saving 
target is well aligned with public and political expectation, but the method how to reach 
the goal is essentially left to the manufacturers. (Moretti, 2003) 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that these goals were in the end similar to 
those that the European Commission might have introduced in the context of MEPS 
that would have been based on the same preliminary studies
4. 
3.2.3. Monitoring of commitments and ways of imposing sanctions 
For the Commission, negotiated agreements on the energy efficiency of household 
appliances must comply with a certain number of conditions if they are to be a 
viable alternative to regulatory measures (Bertoldi and Bowie, 1997):  
-  the manufacturers signing the commitment must account for at least 80% of the 
appliances sold on the European market  
-  the quantitative targets must correspond to a significant improvement in the 
energy efficiency of the appliances over a reasonable timescale  STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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-  finally, the system must include an independent monitoring procedure for 
verifying that improvements are coherent with the stated objectives. 
In accordance with these conditions, the agreement in question involved most of 
the manufacturers in the sector since the CECED represents over 90% of the market 
in a sector where imports from outside the European Union are very limited.  
A procedure for monitoring and reporting was also set up. It was based on a data 
base containing information on the energy performance of washing machines 
marketed in Europe and monitoring by an independent observer of the appliances 
sold. A report was submitted to the Commission once a year setting out the 
improvement achieved.  
The agreement also included measures to dissuade free-riding. Thus, each 
signatory was bound to respect the terms of the agreement concerning the import or 
marketing of inefficient models and to help achieve the average sales-weighted 
energy efficiency improvement. In the case of non-compliance, the CECED would 
first ask the manufacturer to comply with the agreement, and if this failed the 
manufacturer concerned would be deemed no longer party to the negotiated 
agreement. Such decisions are made public in the press, which provided a strong 
incentive for manufacturers to respect their commitments and avoid tarnishing their 
image.  
3.2.4. Results in line with commitments  
The report submitted to the Commission by the CECED at the end of 1999 indicated 
that manufacturers had complied with the commitments they had made. The average 
sales-weighted energy consumption of washing machines at this time was 0.228 
kWh/kg, representing a 24% improvement in energy efficiency compared with the 
reference situation in 1994. The initial objective of 20% for the period 1994-2000 
was achieved and even surpassed before the target date (end of 2000). Similarly, in 
accordance with their commitments, manufacturers had withdrawn the least energy-
efficient models (classes D, E, F and G) from the market; the few models remaining 
in class D had disappeared by the end of 1999. Finally, the report submitted to the 
Commission by the CECED also mentioned additional action taken by 
manufacturers to help control the energy consumed by washing machines 
(improvement in energy efficiency of low-temperature cycles, cooperation with 


































Source: Moretti, 2003 
Figure 2: Evolution of sales of washing machines according to energy classes 
For manufacturers, the results obtained demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
negotiated approach since the objectives defined in consultation with the public 
authority were reached before the planned date (CECED, 2000). Given the success 
of the first voluntary commitment, the manufacturers prepared a second proposal, 
submitted to the European Commission at the end of 2002, which adopted the same 
structure as the first:  
-  an improvement in the average sales-weighted average energy efficiency of 
12% compared with the situation in 1999 (a 33% improvement compared with 
1994) corresponding to an objective of 0.20 kWh/kg for the year 2008; 
-  an end to the import and sale of appliances in energy class D by the end of 
2003;  
-  support of manufacturers for additional measures to achieve energy savings 
(labelling, financial incentives, etc.) as well as different commitments similar to 
those in the previous agreement concerning information for consumers 
 
The first results published at the end of 2003 seem to indicate that manufacturers 
have continued their efforts to improve the energy efficiency of washing machines. 
Sales weighted energy efficiency thus reached 0.208 kWh/kg at the end of 2002, the 
target of 0.20 kWh/kg being fixed for 2008. Similarly, the objective of totally 
eliminating class D models, irrespective of their characteristics, was well underway 
since the number of class D models sold represented no more than 1% of sales. 
3.2.5. A specific characteristic: flexibility 
The commitments made by manufacturers within the framework of these negotiated 
agreements are not very different from the constraints imposed by the regulatory 
measures if we consider in particular the MEPS imposed on domestic cold 
appliances. In the present case, the manufacturers are also committed to a precise STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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calendar for the withdrawal of those appliances with the highest energy 
consumption. 
The fundamental difference in relation to regulatory measures concerns the 
flexibility allowed by the agreements. The objectives indicated above and recalled in 
Figure 2 concern the most popular models, but special provisions are made to take 
into account the significant differences existing between the national markets within 
the European Union: small washing machines and those with low spin speeds, which 
are in widespread use in the countries of southern Europe, benefit from an additional 
period of time in which to adapt. Under the second voluntary commitment, the 
complete elimination of all class D models is only programmed for the end of 2003. 
At the time the first agreement was concluded, between 10 and 11% of machines 
sold in the European Union did not meet the new requirements, but for certain 
manufacturers this proportion was in excess of 30% of sales (CEC, 2000). 
Moreover, if all the washing machines sold in Europe had had to achieve the same 
improvement in energy efficiency, average prices would have increased by 1 to 2% 
in Northern Europe but by as much as 8 to 14% in Southern Europe and the United 
Kingdom where the proportion of machines in the low efficiency classes is highest 
(CEC, 2000). 
For manufacturers, this approach allowing a rapid improvement in energy 
efficiency in northern European markets, where consumers are more sensitive to the 
energy efficiency criteria, and a more gradual change in those of southern Europe, 
thus better takes into account the characteristics of the market and ultimately proves 
to be less costly than non-differentiated regulatory measures. 
Table 2: Flexibility in the agreements for washing machines 
  Target 
date 
A B C D E F G 
General           
Load > 3 kg & Spin speed > 600 rpm   1998          X X X 
   2000      X     
Exceptions           
Load < 3 kg  1998        X  X 
   2000       X    
   2004      X     
Load > 3 kg & Spin speed < 600 rpm  1998          X X X 
 2004      X     
Source: CECED, 2000, 2002. 
4. CONCLUSION: VAS ARE AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR MARKET 
TRANSFORMATION UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS 
Regulatory measures that impose MEPS for all available appliances have proved 
their effectiveness. In association with energy labelling, which encourages 
consumers to differentiate products, they can be effective in stimulating P. MENANTEAU  14
technological progress. However, the regulatory approach assumes a strong 
commitment on the part of public authorities, and preparation times may be long 
because of opposition from manufacturers. Negotiated agreements, by virtue of their 
greater flexibility, which makes them easier to implement, can be an interesting 
alternative to regulations.  
These agreements have a great deal in common with the MEPS introduced for 
cold appliances. They anticipate the gradual removal of the least efficient models 
from the market. A first analysis would therefore suggest that they have no 
particular interest for manufacturers compared with regulations. However, they 
include an important dimension of flexibility which the regulatory approach does 
not have. With negotiated agreements, the manufacturers have the possibility of 
stepping up the introduction of new more efficient models on the more dynamic 
markets and delaying the discontinuation of less efficient models on other markets, 
rather than having to simultaneously improve the efficiency of all their appliances, 
which would be much more costly.  
Similarly, negotiated agreements offer several advantages from the point of view 
of public decision-makers, namely more rapid implementation, a cooperative 
approach that enables access to non-public information, lower preparation and 
monitoring costs on account of the involvement of manufacturers, and so on. The 
essential question, however, concerns their environmental efficiency. To ensure 
improvements from an environmental point of view, manufacturers must make 
commitments that impose a genuine additional effort that goes beyond the general 
trend in energy efficiency.  
In the case of the agreements for washing machines, it was possible to impose 
fairly ambitious objectives because of the threat of regulatory measures. Indeed, the 
possibility of regulatory measures in the household appliance sector became very 
real following the introduction of MEPS for domestic cold appliances. Since the 
bargaining power was then in the hands of the public authority (in this case the 
European Commission), it was able to impose constraining targets (similar to those 
that would have been obtained by energy efficiency regulations). In exchange, 
manufacturers have obtained a certain flexibility regarding implementation periods 
and methods.  
For negotiated agreements to be effective at the environmental level, it is 
essential that the possibility of regulatory measures remain a realistic threat. During 
the negotiating process, the level of constraint imposed, and thus the type of 
incentive to be offered to firms, depends on the respective powers of the companies 
and the public authority. A very restrictive requirement (realistic threat of 
regulations) may result in ambitious objectives that force firms to make real 
additional efforts. On the other hand, if the threat of regulations is not really 
credible, the public authority’s negotiating power is limited and companies have 
considerable room for manoeuvre, with the consequent risk of accepting 
commitments which are not very different from general market trends.  
The credibility of the regulatory threat depends directly on the information the 
public authority has regarding the firms’ room for manoeuvre, the technological 
opportunities available and the implementation costs. Considerable preparatory 
work is thus essential so that the regulating body can obtain a maximum of 
information and negotiate ambitious targets. This means that paradoxically 
negotiated agreements do not necessarily involve shorter implementation times or STANDARDS VERSUS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS                                                     
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lower preparation costs than the regulatory approach if their aim is to achieve the 
same level of environmental efficiency. 
5. NOTES 
1 The Directive was adopted in September 1996 and took effect in the different member States in 
September 1999, in other words 5 years after a first proposal was presented to Parliament.  
2 These rules apply to the most popular models, that is those with a wash capacity of over 3 kg and a 
spin speed of over 600 rpm. Special measures were planned for models of smaller capacity or with slower 
spin speeds (cf infra).  
3 In the second negotiated agreement on the energy efficiency of washing machines (CECED, 2002), 
reference was similarly made to the SAVE II study sponsored by the European Commission which set 
energy efficiency improvement objectives for washing machines (Novem, 2001). However, in this case 
manufacturers did not take up the objective proposed in the study, which was to reduce energy 
consumption to 0.20 kWh/kg by 2003, suggesting instead that they reach this target only by 2008. 
4 For the purpose of comparison, the energy efficiency improvement sought by the introduction of 
performance standards for domestic cold appliances was of the order of 15% for the period 1996-99 
(Bertoldi, 1999). 
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